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ABSTRACT 
The liberalisation of the telecommunication industry in Africa, and the 
further development of the region’s physical infrastructure was accompanied 
by the further development of Africa’s information, communication and 
technology infrastructure. Competition within the industry stimulated heavy 
economic investment in other sectors of the economy. The outcome of 
liberalisation also included the establishment of community-based structures 
that continue to enable communities to manage their own development and 
gain access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) in an 
unprecedented manner. The telecommunication infrastructure further 
stimulated the fast development of other related services, for example, e-
commerce and mobile commerce (m-commerce), e-government, internet 
banking, mobile banking etcetera. Latest reports and statistics disclose that in 
Africa m-commerce is set to even overtake the development of e-commerce, 
through the popular use and penetration of mobile telephony whilst e-
commerce development is constrained by difficulties in rolling out speedily 
fixed telephone lines. These new methods of communication have so 
intensified that there is hope that further penetration of mobile telephony 
would leap-frog economic growth and development in Africa, especially in 
rural communities. Therefore, innovations and investment in ICT’s are 
changing the world in a number of ways, resulting in a globally connected 
digital economy.  However, there are regulatory challenges that need to be 
addressed as a matter of urgency. Certain sections of the continent’s 
population, especially those in rural areas, have very limited access to ICT’s. 
This prevents them from exploiting opportunities offered by ICT’s. The main 
barriers to ICT access relate to inadequate regimes and their supporting legal 
frameworks, high cost of internet access, connectivity problems, the lack of 
technical skills to support maintenance and low number of computers with 
internet connectivity at schools, libraries and other public places. In this 
paper such challenges are identified and further reforms suggested. The 
ultimate recommendation is the one that states that a SADC 
telecommunication independent regulatory agency be established, 
independent of any government ministry, though consulting with a SADC 
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Ministerial Council. Already, some countries in West Africa have developed 
a harmonized regulatory framework designed to integrate the Acts covering 
ICT markets in the sub-region and to keep policy and regulatory frameworks 
in line with the constant evolution of technologies, applications and services. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The information communication technologies (ICTs), have become enablers 
of change though on their own do not create transformation but can best be 
seen as facilitators of change, innovation and creativity. The most important 
economic impact of the spread and use of ICTs is indirect and is through 
transforming the way individuals, business and other parts of the society 
work, communicate, and interact.  In other words, ICTs unleash the creative 
potential embodied in people. Apart from the contribution the ICTs industry 
makes to economic growth and development, it also acts as a catalyst in 
promoting qualitative improvements in other sectors of the economy. 
Reasons for that are that ICTs are generally important intermediates in 
production and in the infrastructure on which the information age is being 
built. It is therefore contended that for Africa, ICTs definitely have the 
potential to strengthen economic growth and to be used to create new 
markets, new technological applications for collaboration, and new methods 
and tools for scientific and technological research.  The ICTs not only 
facilitate information exchange, but actually deepen the change process, 
creating new modes of sharing ideas, and reducing the costs of collecting and 
analyzing information. ICTs are about information flowing faster, more 
generously, and less expensively throughout the planet. As a result, 
knowledge is becoming an important factor in the economy, more important 
than raw materials, capital, labour, or exchange rates. Report of the 
Commission for Science and Technology for Development (2003) states that 
“ICTs refer to technologies people use to share, distribute, gather information 
and communicate, through computers and interconnected computer networks. 
They are a complex and varied set of goods, applications and services used 
for producing, distributing, processing, transforming information, including 
telecoms, TV and radio broadcasting, hardware and software, computer 
services and electronic media.”  The present attitude of Africa’s  governments  
to the ICT industry has since changed. There is a growing consensus that 
national monopolies have become inefficient, costly, and sometimes corrupt 
and therefore must ultimately be opened to private competition if the industry 
is to flourish. Overall, the consensus seems to be that properly used ICTs 
could reduce poverty; empower people; build capacities, skills and networks; 
inspire new governance mechanisms and reinforce popular participation at all 
levels.  The range of applications seem limitless; from electronic commerce 
(e-commerce), mobile commerce (m-commerce), to the empowerment of 
communities, women and youth; from the promotion of good governance and 
decentralization, to advocacy programmes, including the observance of 
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human rights; from long-distance education to tele-health and environmental 
monitoring.  
The process of liberalisation is now being pursued within the World Trade 
Organization’s General Agreement on Trade and Services and Annexures 
thereto. Building the required infrastructure is a daunting problem in Africa, 
but these challenges, under an appropriate  regulatory regime, can be turned 
around into opportunities. Business players and stakeholders in the 
telecommunications industry are generally well-resourced multinational 
companies which are notorious for using their dominant economic influence 
to undermine the natural development of  infant industry. It is for this reason 
that in this paper a proposal is made for the establishment of a strong 
independent, effective, efficient, and well-funded communications regulatory 
authority for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as a 
basis and pioneer for a continental similar project. The aim is to have a 
regulatory regime that will monitor and coordinate the activities of economic 
players and protect consumers and weak government alike. A catalyst for 
economic stability, levelling of the playing ground, providing an environment 
conducive to investment, and helping governments and other stakeholders  
manage their ICTs. 
Section 1 is a brief discussion of the WTO framework on rules and regulation 
that guide the service industry, especially the telecommunications sector. 
Section 2 is a brief survey and an account of progress in the liberalization of 
the telecommunications sector in Africa and, generally, the dismantling of 
State monopoly utilities. Privatization issues are also raised and analysed. 
The future role of mobile telephony industry is particularly included  in 
Section 3, because of its advantages over fixed telephone lines which are 
costly to roll-out in a continent known for its rugged terrain. Besides mobile 
telephony has overtaken  fixed lines in Africa, and its penetration is fast 
growing, even reaching out to remote rural areas. In section 4, the 
competitive environment is analysed more especially as it is influenced by 
the presence and operation of foreign corporate groups. Concerns have been 
expressed about their influence and likely dominance in an industry that is 
capital intensive and employs highly skilled personnel. Section 5 represents 
the ultimate recommendation of this paper, the establishment of a SADC 
Communications Regulatory Authority – SADC-CA. Section 6 is the 
Conclusion. 
 
2. THE TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY: THE WTO 
CONTEXT 
The liberalisation processes in the telecommunications cannot just take place 
outside the WTO framework in terms of the General Agreement on Trade in 
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Services (GATS). Of special importance are the second and third preambular 
paragraphs of GATS which state: 
Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for 
trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under 
conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means 
of promoting the economic growth of all trading partners and the 
development of developing countries; 
Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of 
liberalization of trade in services through successive rounds of 
multilateral negotiations aimed at promoting the interests of all 
participants on a mutually advantageous basis and at securing an overall 
balance of rights and obligations, while giving due respect to national 
policy objectives … 
The trade in services falls broadly into four categories under the WTO 
umbrella:1 those services which are supplied across national borders, those 
services consumed abroad; those services for which a commercial presence is 
required, and those provided through the presence of a natural person. The 
dramatic rise in trade in all of these categories since the establishment of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) reflects liberalisation in capital markets 
and freeing of restrictions on capital flows which have increased the ability of 
large multi-national corporations to enter countries and provide services 
directly.2  
Before this development, and in telecommunications industry, all the three 
standard forms of international growth, i.e. exporting, direct foreign 
investment and non equity agreements, were barred for a long time by the 
institutional set up of national markets of this industry.3 Even international 
telecommunications were treated as an extension of domestic 
telecommunications with tight heavily regulated international oligopoly 
established.4 As observed by Antonelli, the network of each country was 
managed just by one firm, heavily regulated, and most importantly, with a 
strong "national" character. Cristiano Antonelli further states that in almost 
all the States representing developed or developing countries, 
telecommunications services were managed either by state-owned companies 
or directly by public agencies.5 Today what was once a regulatory area, the 
                                                 
1 See Angus Henderson, Iain Gentle & Elise Ball, ‘WTO Principles and Telecommunications 
in Developing Nations: Challenges and Consequences of Accession’ 29 (2005) 
Telecommunications Policy, 205–221 
2 See generally Cristiano Antonelli, ‘Technological Change and Multinational Growth in 
International telecommunications Services’, 10 Review of Industrial Organization, 161-162. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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telecommunications industry has become a market access issue under the 
GATS and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This also, 
increasingly reflects technological advances in the easy provision of services 
across borders.  
Part II of the GATS establishes the general obligations and disciplines to be 
observed by all WTO member states.6 Amongst those likely to have a direct 
impact on telecommunications regulatory regimes are the following: 
• MFN—most favoured nation treatment which is established in 
Article II, 
• legal and regulatory transparency as required by Article III, 
• impartial regulation and access to procedures for review under 
Article VI, 
• the obligation under Article IX to work toward the elimination 
of business practices that may distort competition, and 
• the obligation on members to enter into negotiations regarding 
subsidies. 
Countries make specific commitments, limitations and conditions pursuant to 
Part III of GATS, in respect of market access,7 national treatment,8 and 
additional commitments.9 It is particularly in terms of Articles XVI and XVII 
that specific commitments are made by countries in the telecommunications 
sector in relation to the opening of competition and issue of additional 
licences (market access) and foreign investment (national treatment), 
respectively. 
GATS was initially opposed by most governments in the developing 
countries, as there was a perception that in future there would be dramatic 
increase in the provision of often essential services by foreign entities.10 
These fears were justified on several grounds, amongst which were, that any 
such agreement would threaten the right of governments to maintain public 
services, that liberalisation of services markets under the WTO would 
effectively mean deregulation, and that foreign investment in the supply of 
services would retard the development of the relevant infant local service 
industry. The developing countries had argued that in the service industry 
sector, developed countries were already enjoying comparative advantage 
over developing countries, in a service industry sector which was capital 
                                                 
6 See Bobjoseph Mathew, The WTO Agreements on Telecommunications (2003) , 81-82. 
7 See WTO, GATS, Article XVI. 
8 Ibid. Article XVII. 
9 Ibid, Article XVIII. 
10 See Mathew, note 6 supra,45-46 
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intensive needing highly skilled personnel.11 Obviously, in view of the fact 
that the governments of developing countries typically face tight fiscal 
constraints, there was fear about the dissipation of revenues through foreign 
competition. 
According to the World Trade Organization, the telecommunications services 
are a global market worth over US$ 1.5 trillion in revenue.12 The 
participation of African countries, especially, the least developed countries 
(LDCs), in this sector is very crucial as it has foreign direct investments 
implication in billions of US dollars. The mobile services account for roughly 
40 per cent of this market, while mobile subscribers worldwide currently 
outnumber the use of fixed telephone lines by more than two to one.13 Since 
1998, the market has witnessed far-reaching changes, with the introduction of 
competition into a sector that was once principally a monopoly.14  
Commitments in telecommunications services were first made during the 
Uruguay Round (1986-94), mostly in value-added services. In post-Uruguay 
Round negotiations (1994-97), WTO members negotiated on basic 
telecommunications services. Since then, commitments have been made by 
new members, upon accession to the WTO, or unilaterally at any time. 
According to the WTO report, a total of 108 WTO members have made 
commitments to facilitate trade in telecommunications services.15 These 
commitments include the establishment of new telecoms companies, foreign 
direct investment in existing companies and cross-border transmission of 
telecoms services. Out of this total, 99 members have committed to extend 
competition in basic telecommunications (e.g. fixed and mobile telephony, 
real-time data transmission, and the sale of leased-circuit capacity).16 In 
addition, 82 WTO members have committed to the regulatory principles 
spelled out in the “Reference Paper”, a blueprint for sector reform that largely 
reflects “best practice” in telecoms regulation.17  
Telecommunications, like other services, are included in the services 
negotiations, which began in January 2000. In the current Doha Round of 
negotiations, additional market opening as well as the binding of recent 
reforms (i.e. a commitment not to increase a rate of duty beyond an agreed 
level) in telecommunications is the objective of many of the negotiating 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 See http://www.wto.org last visited 5 May 2009. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See Amin Alhassan, ‘Telecom regulation, the Postcolonial State, and Big Business: The 
Ghanaian Experience’ West Africa Review (2003), 
http://www.westafricareview.comvol4.1.alhassan,html. 
15 See http://www.wto.org TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES: LIST OF 
COMMITMENTS AND EXEMPTIONS Telecommunications commitments and exemptions 
16 Ibid. 
17 See http://www.wto.org last visited 10May 2009-05-12. 
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requests made by WTO members to their trading partners. As of July 2008, 
39 governments had made offers to improve their existing commitments or to 
commit for the first time in the telecommunications sector.  
All in all, the trade rules that apply to telecommunications services include 
the framework articles of the GATS,18 which contain the principles for trade 
in all services. In addition, the GATS also contains an Annex on 
Telecommunications. This provides guarantees for reasonable access to and 
use of public telecommunications, in a given market, by suppliers of all 
services benefiting from commitments scheduled by the member concerned. 
The Reference Paper (RP) is a set of regulatory principles that is legally 
binding for those WTO governments which have committed to it by 
appending the document, in whole or in part, to their schedules of 
commitments. There is therefore no telecoms regulatory regime that can dare 
ignore the contents of the RP document.    
3. PRIVATIZATION AND THE LIBERALISATION IN AFRICA 
As have been stated earlier, infrastructure industries have traditionally been 
monopolies, owned and operated by the public sector. Post-colonial Africa 
was no exception as it inherited holus bolus these models as for much of the 
20th century, infrastructure services in all countries were provided by state-
owned utilities that were vertically integrated.19 In their initial stages these 
models produced some desirable results, later however, their service delivery 
ultimately led to serious problems for the public interest. The problems 
included underinvestment, in large part caused by under-pricing; low 
productivity; poor service quality; long queues and large portions of the 
population without access to basic services; lack of transparency; and 
damaging political interference in the operations of these infrastructure 
entities.  
The primary aim of any liberalisation process is the achievement of effective 
competition. Black et al state that the theoretical justification for privatisation 
and deregulation comes partly from the potential efficiency gains to be had 
from a change in ownership and in market structure.20 That in the 
telecommunications industry specifically, the justification comes also partly 
from a technological revolution which has effectively removed the need for 
state ownership and protection.21 The other gains from privatisation stem 
from the sale of state assets which, coupled with the broadening of the tax 
                                                 
18 See WTO, GATS, Articles II-XV. 
19 See generally Calvin Djiofack-Zebaze & Alexander Keck, ‘Telecommunication Services in 
Africa: The Impact of WTO Commitments and Unilateral Reform in Sector Performance and 
Economic Growth’ Vol 37 No 5 (2009) World Development, 919-940. 
20 See P A Black, PO Baird & A Heese, ‘Ownership and Competition in South African 
Telecommunications’ Vol 65 (2) (1997) South African Journal of Economics,104-111. 
21 Ibid. 
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base, may help governments to break out of their fiscal deadlocks and 
improve their ability to provide public goods and services to their respective 
constituencies.22 Black et al further identify efficiency benefits which derive 
primarily from the nature of principal-agent relationships which are normally 
associated with a system of private ownership and competitive markets.23  
Under such a regime the principal shareholders will see to it that appropriate 
incentive schemes and monitoring procedures are put into place at all levels 
of management, thus ‘minimising practices of moral hazard and adverse 
selection and setting conditions for maintaining high levels of operational 
…efficiency.’24 
Black et al further argue that technological progress (or 'dynamic' efficiency) 
is likewise, likely to be more advanced under private ownership and 
competition than under a system of state control, since under the former 
system managers will more readily adopt new technologies aimed at cutting 
costs and boosting profits.25 Quoting from previous issues of the Economist, 
Black et al state that with regard to the telecommunications industry, it is 
perhaps the technological revolution itself that has triggered the world-wide 
restructuring and privatisation of the industry.26 They opine that technological 
changes have affected virtually the whole of the industry, and are largely 
responsible for the introduction of optical fibres, digitised exchanges, mobile 
and cellular telephones, personal wireless handiphones, and electronic mail. 
They conclude that these changes have effectively broken down entry barriers 
and encouraged governments to liberalise and privatise the industry.27  
Finally, Black et al. state that whilst the process of privatization is still 
ongoing, it is generally necessary to impose price controls on dominant 
operators and, in a network industry, to allow new entrants, at least initially, 
to access the infrastructure of the incumbent.28 This strategy was adopted by 
the South African government. The result was that a range of policy decisions 
on the part of the  South African Government further entrenched Telkom’s 
dominance and restricted the ability of competitors to access bottleneck 
facilities in a manner which would have enabled them to compete.29  These 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26See THE ECONOMIST (1993). "Selling the State", 21-27 August;THE ECONOMIST 
(1993). "Utilities & Telecoms: The Third Wire", 21-28 January;THE ECONOMIST (1993). 
"Asian Telecoms: Private Numbers", 30 September-6 October. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See Gershon Sibinda, ‘Regulatory Environment Analysis in the South African 
telecommunications Industry’  Vol 76(2) 2008 South Africa Journal of Economics, 213-227. 
29 See generally South African Telecommunications Sector Performance Review 2006, Steve 
Esselaar, Alison Gillwald & Christoph Stork (eds), LINK Centre Public Policy Research Paper 
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included the restriction placed on value-added service (VANS) providers as 
to where they could obtain facilities. It has now been acknowledged that the 
unbundling of the local loop and opening international gateways (such as the 
SAT-3 undersea cable), to operators are pro-competitive interventions that 
have proven successful elsewhere. However when it comes to Telkom similar 
measures have not been imposed in South Africa.30  Unfortunately, alongside 
a market structure wherein competition is inhibited, is ICASA, a regulatory 
authority which is equipped with such inadequate resources that will not 
enable it control Telkom’s retail and access prices.31  The general observation 
is that the South African telecommunications market is presently 
characterised by very limited competition and a regulator without the means 
necessary to control the dominant operator.32 The result is that prices of 
telecommunications services are extremely high in relation to other 
jurisdictions.  African governments have also given reasons for market access 
restrictions. Among others was the desire to give incumbents time to prepare 
for competition, for examples: Telkom in South Africa (fixed); Ethiopia 
(mobile & fixed); Cameroon (fixed). There was secondly the consideration to 
increase government revenue from privatization and the argument that 
exclusive rights were necessary to attract strategic investment, and to reserve 
exclusive rights in order to allow for the provision of universal service. 
The challenge is for governments to develop capacity within their public 
service. Capacity building and training projects will enable governments 
analyse telecommunications market conditions; set policy frameworks; draw 
up, negotiate and enforce contracts; regulate monopolies; coordinate, finance 
and support producers; enable community self-provision; protect consumers 
and provide them with information on their options and remedies. There must 
however be realization that privatization is not the end of government 
participation but rather a new beginning. It is against this backdrop of 
complexities that this paper proposed the establishment of a regional 
telecommunications independent regulatory agency. 
Many countries in Africa have completed the initial stages of reforming their 
telecommunication sector. Others are just initiating the process. All African 
countries seek to turn the digital divide into a digital opportunity and address 
the emerging broadband gap. Creating an enabling environment to attract 
investment is essential to meeting this goal. Policies being introduced deal 
with issues of privatization, establishment of national regulatory authorities, 
and enabling environment for competition. In 2007, Connect Africa reported 
that, at least, some thirty African economies (or 55 per cent) had at least 
                                                                                                                    
No. 8 Learning Information Networking and Knowledge (LINK) Centre Graduate School of 
Public and Development Management Witwatersrand University. 
30 See ITU, CASE STUDY, BROADBAND THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1-27. 
31 See Sibinda, note 28 supra, 225-227. 
32 Ibid. 
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partially privatized their incumbent telecoms operator.33 It has been observed 
that privatization sends a strong signal that policy decisions and regulations 
will be fair to all in the market place. The Connect Africa Background Paper 
opines that ‘fostering a level playing-field is more likely if the State avoids 
being both a market player (i.e. owner or part-owner of the incumbent) and a 
referee at the same time.”34 In the same Paper, it is reported that forty-five 
African economies (or eighty-three percent) have established a 
telecommunication/ICT regulatory authorities, with sixteen created since 
2000.35 However though in Africa some effective regulatory bodies have 
been identified, other continent’s regulatory authorities lack the power to 
enforce pro-competitive regulatory decisions and many more require capacity 
building initiatives in order to become more effective regulators.  
Rolling out fixed telephone lines is costly and few SADC countries can 
afford from their meagre resources such massive physical infrastructure. The 
capital is scarce, moreover savings are generally poor and the tax base very 
narrow. Foreign direct investment and policies related thereto should be 
specially addressed by a specialized body not an individual State 
communications department. As stated by Lydon and Williams, higher 
investment is central to achieving sustainable economic growth and poverty 
eradication.36 Such higher investment can be achieved through FDI flows. In 
their study, Lydon and Williams, focused in particular on the relationship 
between FDI flows into developing countries and the penetration of 
telecommunications network in the recipient country. They found that both 
fixed and mobile communications networks ‘are positively linked with 
inward FDI.’37FDI is also associated with privatization in the African market 
for mobile telephony. 
 
 4. MOBILE TELEPHONY AND PRIVATIZATION 
Currently, mobile telephony is the most important mode of 
telecommunications in developing countries. It has been observed, that while 
internet access has become a reality for many businesses and public 
institutions, and for individuals with higher levels of education and income, 
for the vast majority of the low-income population, mobile telephony is likely 
to be the sole tool connecting them to the information society in the short to 
                                                 
33 See Connect Africa, ‘Creating an Enabling Environment for Investment’, Background Paper, 
Session 5 (20070 Connect Africa Summit, 20-30 October 2007. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See Reamonn & Mark Williams, COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES no 58, 2nd quarter 
2005, 43. 
37 Ibid. 
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medium term.38 Privatization has been brisk in Africa with regard to the 
liberalization of the mobile telephone industry.39 Around 1996, telephone 
density in Africa was under one subscriber per 1000 inhabitants and it was 
thought that the region’s development potential would be severely curtailed 
for a long time until this low density was reversed. However, by 2001, Africa 
reached a historic milestone with a density of one telephone subscriber per 
100 inhabitants. The remarkable growth in so short a time has been attributed 
to the region’s remarkable economic growth, the doubling of export trade, the 
liberalization of telecommunications, and the marriage between African 
subscribers to telecommunication services and mobile cellular and pre-paid 
card services. The underlying proposition is that, of all ICTs, mobile 
telephony has the most immediate potential to stimulate growth in the 
developing countries, and especially in Africa, in particular in sectors where 
entrepreneurship and access to market information are important factors. 
Mobile telephony has real economic consequences, particularly for micro-
entrepreneurs.  
The technology and infrastructure prerequisites saw the majority of countries 
in Africa deploy GSM-based networks.40 GPRS- and EDGEtechnologies 
have also been deployed in some of the comparatively developed mobile 
markets. Demand in broadband internet services is very high even though 
only few Africans are capable of affording them, making 3G service a viable 
business opportunity for mobile operators in the major cities in the continent. 
Some of the market players feel that 3G services will fill the void created in 
the regions where decent fixed line infrastructure is scarce and subscribers 
are unable to access the Internet.41 
At least 15 mobile operators have already announced plans of introducing 3G 
services including existing networks in South Africa, Egypt and Tanzania and 
others planned in Kenya, Namibia and Nigeria. Only 5 percent of subscribers 
availed 3G voice and data service by 2006, according to Informa Telecoms 
and Media, an industry watcher. The relevance of mobile phones for small 
businesses in developing countries was noted in UNCTAD’s Information 
Economy Report 2005. The use of mobile telephony in the conduct of 
business reduces the costs and increases the speed of transactions. Mobile 
connectivity sidesteps some important obstacles to other types of 
connectivity. It is not hampered by, among other things, cost and the 
remoteness of certain areas.  
In Africa, mobile phones have proved so successful that in many cases they 
                                                 
38 See Information Economy Report 2007-2008, Chapter 8, 2. 
39 See generally, African Mobile Fact book www.africantelecomsnews.com last visited 3 May 
2009. 
40 Ibid. 7-8. 
41 Ibid. 
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have  replaced fixed lines. Almost 56 percent of the sub-Saharan Africa 
countries now allow competition in mobile cellular, up from 7 percent in 
1995; only six countries lacked cellular services in 2001, compared with 28 
in 1995; and 4 of 5 subscribers on the continent use pre-paid mobile service. 
Moreover, the growth in mobile cellular services is outstripping fixed 
telephone services by geometric proportions. In 2001, mobile cellular 
overtook fixed telephone subscribers for the first time, with 28 million 
compared to 22 million subscribers. By 2005, there will be 130 million phone 
subscribers in the region, 98 million of them mobile cellular subscribers.  
There are several reasons for the rapid growth in mobile phone in Africa 
market. But the two most important are: first, the limited penetration of fixed-
lines telephone network, lack of investment, inadequate private-sector 
involvement, foreign exchange scarcity (lack of trade), poor management 
incentives; second, the prepaid system which has its own advantages - low 
operating cost; no credit and less fraud than fixed line. 
By 2007, the summary results of mobile telephony penetration in Africa was 
represented as follows:42 
• At the end of 2007 there were over 280 million mobile phone 
subscribers in Africa, representing a penetration rate of 30.4 
percent  
• Africa has become the fastest growing mobile market in the 
world with mobile penetration in the region ranging from 30 
percent to 100 percent from country to country.  
• Fastest growing markets are in Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt  
• Increased competition as more operators come online in each 
country (11 in Nigeria, 4 in Kenya and SA, 3 in Egypt and 
Morocco)  
• Pre-paid subscriptions account for nearly 95 percent of total 
mobile subscriptions in the region.  
• The Democratic Republic of Congo, population 60 million, has 
10,000 fixed telephones but more than a million mobile phone 
subscribers.  
• In Chad, the fifth-least developed country, mobile phone usage 
jumped from 10,000 to 200,000 in three years. 
 
                                                 
42 See Mobile Penetration Statistics from Africa, African Telecommunication / ICT 
Indicators 2008: At Crossroads. 
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5. COMPETITION AND FOREIGN CONTROL 
There is fear that in future, the pioneer telecommunications service providers 
in the mobile telephony industry, may be vulnerable to international control, 
international sabotage, or to predatory economic practices. This in spite of the 
fact that the initial boon in mobile cellular telecommunications services in the 
continent was initiated by a new breed of pan-African mobile companies. 
These companies were in the first place not state-owned nor large 
multinationals as was previously speculated. This should be viewed against 
the background that, virtually in every country there is either lax regulation or 
weak regulatory framework for protecting both the new market providers and 
domestic consumers of cellular telecommunications services. The infant 
domestic telecom industry might not withstand the dominant multinational 
corporations economic power of competition. Multinationals in developed 
countries have huge advantages in technological and marketing capability, 
will enjoy comparative advantages over local industries. These multinationals 
will, once they enter the market, displace local operators and put them out of 
business as SADC telecom markets become attractive. The emergent players 
in the private telecommunications markets in the SADC region are not only 
small in market capitalization, but are failing to recognize the advantages of 
economies of scale. Players in these markets have not so far realized 
synergies by cooperating with one another. Instead, they are presently 
engaged in highly predatory and ruinous competition that leave them exposed 
and vulnerable to larger international entities who are making inroads into the 
SADC and Africa market. Eventually, the lucrative profits and revenues 
envisaged in the sector will in future accrue to foreign shareholders. Another 
observation made is that where strategic alliances are being made between 
providers of domestic mobile cellular services and foreign investors, the 
locus of control and strategic opportunities for both dominating and 
disrupting the markets of sub-Sahara Africa countries are located either in the 
United States, Holland, England, or the Middle East. And in some of these 
cases, the foreign partners have strategic alliances with military, industrial, 
and intelligence services in their host nations. For example, the major players, 
along with their home country affiliations in the African market include: RSA 
Security (Dutch/U.S.A.); MTN or Mobile Telephone Networks (South 
Africa); ECONET (Zimbabwe); PM Tech (U.S.A./UK); Oracle (U.S.A.); 
Microsoft (U.S.A.); and Orascom (Egypt).  
The density of integration of the African communications networks with the 
foreign operations is as remarkable as it is invisible to all but the most critical 
observers. First, there is the element of platform interconnectivity, as in the 
joining of the West African Submarine Cable (WASC) system with the South 
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African Far East (SAFE) cable system.43 SAFE is submarine fibre optic cable 
measuring 28,000 kilometres and linking Europe to Africa and Asia, designed 
to carry telephone, multimedia and internet traffic. This huge project, costing 
USD640 million, was financed by a consortium of 36 international operators 
including France Telecom, which invested USD96 million or 15 percent of 
the total. The SAT-3/WASC/Safe submarine cable will enable broadband 
telecommunication services in particular to be strengthened.44  Also, the West 
Africa Cable System (WACS) will boost broadband capacity and could cut 
comparatively high Internet tariffs in Africa's biggest economy, which has 
relied on a single international cable controlled for years by Telkom.  
What is curious about this SAFE system is that it is anchored in Kochi, 
Kerala (India). But its operations and the profile of the services it provides 
have significant implications for Africa and many non-African countries. 
West Africa is also currently served by two cables (Atlantis II and SAT-3). 
Besides, seven more are planned; namely, Glo-1, Main-1, WAFS, Infinity, 
Uhurunet, AWCC/WACS, ACE. The investment would either be into the 
WACS cable which would run to London, or more likely the ACE (Africa 
Coast to Europe) cable planned by France Telecom which would run via 
Cape Verde and Portugal to France.45   
With this type of integration, cable and satellite services have been linked 
between Far East Asia, Africa, and Europe, with connection points in India, 
Durban, the Reunion Island, Mauritius, Malaysia, Melkbosstrand (S. Africa), 
Angola, Gabon, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Senegal, the Canary 
Islands, Spain, and Portugal. The system, with its controls in India, already 
has 42 telecommunications companies located in 35 countries using its 
services.  
Platform interconnectivity via computer and database-linked systems such as 
those provided by the U.S.-based Microsoft and the Oracle corporations, 
illustrates, the now dominance of foreign telecom operating entities in Africa. 
Although they provide no visible mobile cellular telecommunications 
services, they control and virtually own the hardware operating systems 
                                                 
43 See further http//wwwglobalinsight.com, where it is stated  that Portugal Telecom and its 
subsidiary Cape Verde Telecom have reportedly invested US$50 million in a West African 
submarine cable WASC), which will connect Cape Verde and Portugal. According to Macau 
Hub, the investment is part of an international consortium. The report says that the cable will 
run along the west coast of Africa and have landing points in Cape Verde, Portugal, and 
London; it is due to become operational in 2011. Besides Cape Verde Telecom, in which 
Portugal Telecom owns a 40% stake, the operator also has subsidiaries in Morocco, Guinea 
Bissau, Sao Tome & Principe, Angola and Namibia. According to Macau Hub, Portugal 
Telecom plans to use the cable for connectivity to some of its African operations as well as its 
own Internet connectivity to the hub in London. Cape Verde Telecom had an international 
bandwidth of 24 Mbps in 2006 and 68 Mbps in 2007 
44 See SAFE http://www.safe-sat3.co,.za 
45 Ibid. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(4) 
87 
 
platforms, the routing networks, the databases, and the appliances that run 
and remotely monitor every computer and database operation in the region. 
Of late, Microsoft, has struck strategic partnership with PM Tech Holdings 
for software solutions development, networking, database management, e-
security, and IT (information technology) consulting.46 PM Tech already has 
extensive holdings in the petroleum, financial, telecommunications sectors of 
Nigeria, Cameroon, the Congo, Swaziland, Botswana, and it is rapidly 
expanding its operations throughout West Africa. Also, it is targeting Kenya, 
Namibia, Mozambique, and Zambia. Oracle Corporation has already set up 
shop in Abidjan as a regional hub and with its business applications suites 
and networking solutions already controls 80 percent of all public 
administration projects in West Africa, all banking operations, 
telecommunications services, and is seeking to establish strategic 
partnerships with companies with defense industry links.47 RSA Security, a 
major South-African military defense industry subsidiary at one point, has 
Dutch and US affiliations with headquarters in Bedford, MA.48 The 
company’s expertise includes electronic security solutions and e-security 
intelligence and it has established strategic partnership with Schlumberger-
Sema, a global information technology services company, to provide smart 
card-based solutions that interface with RSA Security smart cards operations 
in banking and other services throughout Africa. RSA Security already boasts 
12 million customers worldwide. In 2001, e-security solutions accounted for 
100% of RSA Security revenues. In 2000, the company reported a gross 
income of $280.2 million and an after-tax profit of $205.8 million. Econet, a 
small Zimbabwe wireless company, secured in 2002 contracts worth $50 
million to deliver international commercial satellite services to customers, 
providing linkage between African countries and Europe, allowing Econet to 
gain European footprints, but with heavy reliance and dependence on UK 
companies that provide the gateway into Europe. Then, as a last there is 
Orascom as a last example. Orascom is an Egyptian company, with 57 
percent of the stock held by the Sawaris family of Egypt, presently operating 
in 18 Middle Eastern and sub-Saharan Africa countries, with a mobile 
cellular link hub in Belgium.49 Orascom’s core business activities are 
extensive and touch on a wide swath of sub-Sahara Africa life -- IT, 
computer-related services, hotels, medical, dental, hospital supplies, 
construction and petroleum services.  
These inroads by foreign capital, now translating into multibillions of US 
dollars, will eventually swallow infant industry in the SADC region in the 
                                                 
46 See www.pmtech.net last visited 12 May 2009.05.12 
47 See Oracle The World’s Largest Enterprise Software Company 
http:www.oracle.com/index.html last visited 11 May 2009.05.12 
48 See RSA SecurityD http://www.rsa.com/mode.aspx?id+1156 last visited 10 May 2009. 
49 See http://www.otelecom.com/ last visited 9 May 2009 
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whole of the telecommunications sector. Weak, economically 
underdeveloped, sometimes corrupt States in the SADC region might never 
have power to coordinate and monitor the dangerous and negative activities 
of these companies in a sector industry which is by its nature,  capital and 
resource intensive, and deploying highly skilled personnel in all its divisions. 
6. SADC COMMUNICATIONS INDEPENDENT REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been in 
existence since 1980, when it was formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-
ruled States in Southern Africa known as the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the main aim of coordinating 
development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then 
apartheid South Africa. The founding Member States are: Angola, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The present States membership include: Angola, 
Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
The need for the establishment of an independent regulatory authority for 
telecommunications in the SADC region is motivated by the existence of a 
number of factors political, economical, developmental, and all in the ever 
globalizing world. One of the central objectives of SADC is to forge links 
among Member States to create a genuine and equitable regional integration 
and promote advancement of its citizens, thereby raising the quality and 
standard of life and, consequently, alleviating poverty. The enabling factors 
to achieve this goal include: co-operation in infrastructure development, 
coordination of sectoral plans and programmes, promotion of investment and 
production, and the development of indigenous contents, are still being 
harnessed.  
The telecommunications has been identified by SADC members as one of the 
key infrastructures that still has to progress to the desirable standard. A large 
scale and advanced telecommunications infrastructure in SADC, capable of 
delivering telecommunication services, has been recognised as a pre-requisite 
for economic growth. Therefore, the availability of adequate communications 
links within both individual countries, the region and internationally is 
accepted by stakeholders as an essential instrument to facilitate intra-SADC 
and extra-SADC trade, leading to socio-economic development. It has 
however been acknowledged in the region and confirmed through various 
studies, including those of the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), that there is a serious inadequacy of info-communications capacity. 
As the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital intensifies, the 
telecommunications sector is certainly going to be capitalized in massive 
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proportions and become complex to regulate. In place must the therefore be 
an independent, efficient, effective, transparent, well-funded and well staffed, 
technologically endowed regional regulatory regime. A regime capable of 
engaging and reining the power and economic dominance of multination 
companies and other powerful stakeholders in the ICT sector, in particular the 
Telkom corporate group structure.  
There are a variety of explanations for the adoption of regulatory statutes or 
treaties, most of which amount to justification. Regulatory legal regimes can 
be distinguished according to function. Sunstein asserts that many statutes in 
this regard are responding to market failures.50 For example, in the field of 
regulation against a monopolistic business practice, regulatory statutes are, 
least controversially, a response to the risks of monopoly. Regulation may be 
a response to collective action problems, coordination questions and 
transaction costs.51 Sunstein states that it is a familiar point that individually 
rational private behaviour may produce collective or public irrationality.52 
For instance, if everyone acts in his/her self-interest, serious harm will 
sometimes result. Instances in this regard involve public or collective goods 
which are characterised by   two features, non-rivalrous consumption and 
non-excludability. In cases of this nature, each person acting rationally is 
tempted to ‘free ride’ while others pay, the consequence being that the good 
would not be provided for all. Sunstein states further that government 
regulation is needed to eliminate the free-rider problem and to ensure the 
public goods will be created.53 However in this paper I deal with a regulatory 
agency of a special kind, an independent regulatory agency (IRA), on 
telecommunications dealing with ICT services and goods and personnel with 
an ICT infrastructure. A regime that owes its creation to a collective group of 
independent who have undertaken to shed part of their sovereigny to establish 
a regulatory regime that is not accountable to any particula State. The 
strategy is to avopid capture by any State member or a particular State 
Ministry. Opportunities for corruption are immediately eliminated in a sector 
valued in trillions of US dollars, and still growing in tandem with the nergy 
sector (not discussed here). 
Accordingly, in this paper, an IRA is exclusively defined as an agency having 
its own powers and responsibilities under public law; whose organizational 
structure is separated from government ministries and whose members are 
neither directly elected by people nor managed by elected officials. If these 
                                                 
50 See  Cass R Sunstein ‘The Functions of Regulatory Statutes’  in G Teubner (ed), After the 
Rights regulation: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (1990), 48-55; see also Barry Barton 
‘The Theoretical Context of Regulation’ in Barry Barton, Lila K Barrera-Hernández, Alastair 
R Lucas & Annita Ronne (eds), Regulating Energy and Natural Resources (2006)), 16-17. 
51 Sunstein, note 50 supra, 49. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Sunstein, note 50 supra, 49. 
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are the minimum requirements that this regional IRA should meet in order to 
be counted as really independent, then those agencies which are organized as 
units of ministries, organic organs of government or within the bureaucracy 
should be excluded from the analysis, because these latter referred to 
formations are exercising state power under the direct control of ministers 
and the civil service. Moreover, their powers and institutional designs are not 
independent from the government. Immediately therefor Telkom (SA) and 
other State utilities in the telecommunications sector are excluded from 
participating in this envisioned regional IRA, and this includes ICASA.  
This envisaged regional IRA structure will also have intergovernmental 
features, though not monopolised by a single parliament (or ministries) of 
participating States in that there will be regular consultative summit with 
State Ministers in charge of ICT and infrastructure. It must be understood that 
ICT products are cross-cutting, multi-media and defy geographical 
boundaries. Added to these factors are the magnitude, technical complexity 
and the variability of the material or entities being regulated. There is also a 
need to remove these matters from direct political control and to follow a 
quasi-judicial mode of procedure that includes enforcement. As stated by 
Barry Barton,54 regulation (independent regulatory authority) often pursues 
multiple processes and is also a matter that cannot be left to the courts of law. 
Barton also distinguishes the relative roles these two institutions (courts and 
regulatory agencies) play. He states that,55 
regulatory agencies must often develop and implement policy 
consistently with other public agencies, while the courts are independent. 
Regulation is generally a long-term engagement with an area activity, 
while the judicial process is one of deciding each matter that is brought to 
court. Regulation usually looks ahead, while the courts are usually 
concerned with applying the law to past events. The focus of regulation is 
the management of an area of activity, as applied by law, rather that the 
determination of rights under the law… 
Barton also offers a cogent argument why on the other hand regulation is not 
left in the hands of the executive. He states,  
[i]n the United States in particular, regulatory agencies were established 
because it was necessary to entrust aspects of the public interest to 
independent scientific experts, removed from politics, and from outside 
the normal civil service framework.’56 
A number of initiatives have been undertaken by several institutions, 
including the ITU to address this critical problem. One valuable initiative is 
                                                 
54 See Barry Barton ‘The Theoretical Context of Regulation’ in Barton et al, note 50 supra,15. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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the African Green Paper that focuses entirely on the problems of 
telecommunications in Africa and offers a comprehensive policy guideline 
for countries in Africa to harmonise telecommunications sector policies as a 
strategy to develop telecommunications infrastructure and services. There is 
also the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology 
which  prescribes the development of a harmonised regional policy with the 
provision of reliable, effective and affordable telecommunications services, 
as its central goal. The Protocol specifies actions that will have to be 
undertaken to transform the state of the national and regional 
telecommunications infrastructures from their present state of under-capacity 
to an integrated and advanced info-communications network. 
Regional policy on telecommunications becomes even more crucial in this 
period of globalisation of the world economy, where telecommunications is 
reckoned as both a tradable service and transport of info-communications 
services. In this context, the capability of an individual State for effective 
delivery of services is not likely to contribute to stronger regional co-
operation. Instead there is now unnecessary duplication of structures and 
efforts, dissipation of funds from foreign donors directed to improve 
individual State’s ICT structures but diverted to other irrelevant programmes 
or projects through capture and failure to prioritise. From the beginning two 
benefits may be realised.. Firstly, a group of countries combines their 
strengths, on one hand, to resist competitive threats and, on the other hand, to 
take advantage of the opportunities that emerge in the global market, such as 
the transport of international telecommunications or information traffic. 
Secondly, the group of SADC countries will present a larger market to 
private investors who could find an opportunity to achieve standardisation 
and economies of scale, factors that may be decisive in investment decisions. 
Finally, the interest of society as a whole must be taken into consideration in 
any decision affecting the development of the telecommunications industry. 
7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Establishment, through treaty and protocols of the SADC 
Independent Communications Authority (SADC-CA). 
B. The personnel should be independent of and not be appointees of 
SADC member States governments; neither should the personnel be 
drawn from SADC related ministries. 
C. SADC-CA will hold quarterly consultative summit meetings with 
SADC telecommunications ministries and other relevant bodies, with 
a major mandate to develop and adopt Telecommunications Acts and 
other ICT related rules and regulations. 
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D. All the functions of the already existing telecommunications agencies 
under State ministries, and those of existing so-called independent 
regulatory agencies would be subsumed under SADC-CA. 
E. Funding of SADC-CA will come from contributions made by SADC 
member States – from each according to its means in terms of a 
certain percentage of a State’s GDP. Consequently all the employees 
of SADC are paid from the fund administered exclusively by the 
Authority. 
F. Foreign ICT aid presently enjoyed by respective individual States, 
will in future be directed to the exclusive use of the Authority – to 
minimise abuse by political leaders and to avoid stakeholder capture. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
The world is witnessing an upsurge in the use of telecommunications and 
information in nearly all aspects of human endeavour. The wireless 
revolution and the internet phenomenon have recently changed the way 
people live and transact business, and the telecommunications/information 
technology industry has taken centre stage in world affairs and will continue 
to be so far into the foreseeable future. The WTO has confirmed that the 
world telecommunications and information technology industry was worth 
US$ One trillion in market capitalization. In Africa, there is however dearth 
of telecommunications infrastructure, though the penetration has been 
noticeable over the past decade, mostly through the dismantling of State 
monopolies, especially the telecommunications State utilities, sustained 
without an efficient telecommunications infrastructure. Telecommunications 
and information technology  present copious opportunities for the creation of 
unprecedented wealth for Africa. For Africa to benefit from these 
opportunities, it needs to improve services by eradicating misuse of 
monopoly powers and inefficient use of public resources, The African States 
need also remove policies that fostered and encouraged the dominance of the 
public sector in national economies in order to attract modern industries and 
business - of course to attract foreign investment. Granted some significant 
progress has been made in some countries, though there are challenges on the 
way. There is now a general awareness all over the continent of the need for 
liberalisation, with some countries moving faster than the others. Some 
countries have embraced liberalisation and there have been remarkable 
progress, thus encouraging others to move in the same direction. Studies 
associate foreign direct investment with economic growth rates, and that 
improvements in the telecommunications industry stimulate FDI inflows. The 
framework for these reforms is provided for by GATS in terms of its overall 
annexures. The telecommunications industry is complex and resource 
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intensive and requires massive capital outlays. The industry also demands 
highly skilled and technologically endowed personnel. Such skills and capital 
are not readily available in Africa. In the SADC region the level of savings is 
very low and the dominance of the South African economy and its 
multinationals is a cause for fear. The SA’S State's utility, TELKOM, is still 
under managed liberalisation. It would be in the interest of the SADC region 
to establish through treaties and protocols a regional independent 
communications regulatory authority. This will require that SADC member 
States relinquish part of their sovereignty and allow their respective 
regulatory agencies to be subsumed under the envisaged independent regional 
regulatory agency (IRA). This regional IRA will have powers to deal with 
excesses designed by multinationals while levelling the playing field, giving 
certainty to the markets whilst providing security to investors. The WTO 
Reference Paper which is a blueprint for the telecommunications sector can 
always be consulted by policy makers when developing future policies, rules 
and regulations for an acceptable efficient, effective, transparent regulatory 
regime. Highly skilled personnel should be recruited and trained. To avoid 
capture by dominant stakeholders all the personnel regulatory agency will not 
be accountable to their respective home governments. The regulatory regime 
will be in charge of its own funding and finances and will regularly hold 
quarterly consultative summit meetings with ministries relevant to the 
telecommunications industry. 
 
 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 4(4) 
94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
